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Executive Summary 
This is an options paper. It plants seeds and nurtures budding ideas that could grow into legal 
developments. It is not a treatise on the current law. Quite to the contrary, a good working 
knowledge of the law of charities is assumed as the extant law is taken as a springboard for 
discussion of possibilities. The paper’s role is to generate constructive, even lively discussion.  
Important issues and implications are flagged rather than traversed as the paper seeks to cut 
straight to central issues and to be brief. Four options are sketched. Recommendations are not made 
as to which option is to be preferred. There are strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
with each of the four approaches canvassed. 
Charitable purpose is defined at law for two quite different reasons. One is to define the scope of a 
regulator’s jurisdiction and the other is to act as a gateway to favours such as income tax exemption 
or deductibility. These are quite different purposes.  This foundation distinction becomes important 
when considering the options. The paper therefore begins with a discussion of this distinction. The 
following four options are then discussed: 
1. The status quo: This proposal is put forward, not only because it is presently working at least 
satisfactorily, but also because it is a benchmark against which all alternatives must be 
measured and shown to be an improvement. The paper takes the problem of public benefit 
under the status quo and looks at how this issue has been addressed. The conclusion 
suggested is that the response in other jurisdictions is not necessarily superior to the 
response in New Zealand and therefore the status quo in New Zealand in relation to this 
issue is at least defensible. Turning to the issue of stultifying common law development, the 
issue of political purposes is taken as an example and the conclusion reached there is that 
the common law can continue to develop. There may be a practical problem for charities 
funding litigation to appellate courts to ensure the law develops. It is suggested that 
practical solutions to this problem could include no cost orders and test case funding. Either 
way, the common law can continue to develop. The status quo is a defensible position to 
take.  
 
2. Pemsel plus: This proposal is essentially the same as the status quo but with the addition of 
other purposes by statute as needed from time to time by the New Zealand community. This 
follows the concept set out in a minimalist way in Australia’s Extension of Charitable Purpose 
Act 2004 and it is the approach taken in the United Kingdom Charities Act 2006. This 
approach has some appeal as it will address some concerns. There are limitations with this 
approach that must be acknowledged. We have set out, in Schedules to this paper, 
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legislative models from various common law jurisdictions as examples to inform discussion 
of this option. In the UK, cases are now progressing to superior courts in response to this 
approach and extensive parliamentary reviews will take place in 2011. We suggest that it 
may be prudent to await these developments in the UK before committing to a particular set 
of changes or form of wording if this option is to be pursued.  
3. Identify the spirit and Intendment of the Preamble: This option seeks to identify the 
essence of the Preamble with a view to replacing it with modern language. Replacing the 
Preamble requires identification of the function that its ‘spirit and intendment’ plays.  In this 
section the role the Preamble plays is recognized as identifying purposes that (in addition to 
being for public benefit) are pursued altruistically and voluntarily. A form of wording that 
would replace the Preamble is offered.   
4. A nonprofit sector approach (with carve-out):  This proposal takes cognizance of the early 
history of exemption in New Zealand and developments in other disciplines, particularly 
economics, and sets out an alternative framework for reform. In summary it builds from, but 
also differs from, the current common law approach which seeks to list purposes entitled to 
recognition as charitable. This approach identifies the whole nonprofit sector and then 
carves out from that whole sector purposes which are not charitable. The net effect could be 
the same but the approach is quite different.   
These four alternatives provide paradigms for discussion. Of course hybrid combinations are also 
open.  
We then turn to the question of justification of favours extended to charities. We point out that the 
reasons for favour are not well established but contributions of public benefit are central. We 
suggest two new models for carrying forward the discussion regarding this aspect of the law.  
We conclude noting that New Zealand seems well positioned to explore all or any of these options 
and in that regard is perhaps to be envied by many other common law jurisdictions.  
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The Brief 
This Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies was briefed to advise the Charities 
Commission of New Zealand on ways in which the law might be developed. 
The substantive issue underpinning the brief is a need to enable charity law in New Zealand to 
continue to develop in accordance with the values of New Zealand society.  In practical terms what 
this means is that there is no difficulty with the first three heads recognised as charitable purposes 
under Pemsel's case,1 but challenges arise when dealing with what is to be included in the fourth 
head, other purposes beneficial to the community. To understand and interpret the fourth head the 
New Zealand Charities Commission must continually reference the spirit and intendment of the 
Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.2
The question framing this brief then becomes: is it possible to modernise the concept of charity to 
do away with the reference to the Statute of Charitable Uses without losing the 400 years of charity 
jurisprudence? 
 This is less than ideal.  
This paper provides four options with commentary on advantages and disadvantages of each. The 
four options canvassed are as follows: 
1. The status quo. This proposal is put forward, not only because it is presently working at 
least satisfactorily, but also because it is a benchmark against which all alternatives must 
be measured and shown to be an improvement. 
 
2. Pemsel plus. This proposal is essentially the same as the status quo but adds other 
purposes by statute as needed from time to time by the New Zealand community. This 
follows the concept set out in a minimalist way in the Extension of Charitable Purpose 
Act 2004 in Australia and in a broader manner in the United Kingdom’s Charities Act 
2006.  
 
3. Identify the spirit and Intendment of the Preamble. This proposal seeks to identify the 
essence of the Preamble with a view to replacing it with modern language. Replacing 
reference to the Statute of Charitable Uses requires us to identify the function that the 
spirit and intendment of the Preamble plays.  Once the role of the Preamble is identified 
an alternative conception is provided. 
  
                                                          
1 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (Pemsel’s case) 
2 A reference to the Preamble throughout this paper is a reference to the preamble to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz c 4 (Statute of Elizabeth).  
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4. A non-profit sector approach (with carve-out).  This proposal takes cognizance of the 
early history of exemption in New Zealand and developments in other disciplines, 
particularly economics, and sets out an alternative framework for reform. In summary it 
builds on, but also differs from the current common law approach which seeks to list 
purposes entitled to recognition as charitable purposes. This approach identifies the 
whole nonprofit sector and then carves out purposes which are not charitable. The net 
effect can be the same but the approach is quite different.   
Before embarking upon a discussion of these options there is an important threshold issue that is 
frequently overlooked but is central to how charitable purpose is defined. The threshold question is: 
‘why is charitable purpose being defined’? We therefore comment briefly upon this. There is a 
second very important and related issue and that is: why do charities enjoy favour? This issue will be 
left for discussion after the four possible options are considered. At the end, we put forward two 
alternative ways of justifying access to favours, both drawn from contributions to public benefit. 
First, a simple continuum of public benefit is suggested: the greater the contribution to public 
benefit the greater the entitlement to favour. The second is a suggestion that favour be granted to 
organisations that belong to particular classes.  Three classes developed from the four set out in 
Pemsel’s case are offered for consideration. We come first to the question of why charitable purpose 
is defined. 
 
Clarity about the Function of Defining Charity 
As Peter Luxton, a British expert on charity law, declared: ‘There is no necessary link between 
charitable status and tax relief’.3 This is not a new idea. The need to distinguish the two different 
functions performed by what the law labels ‘charitable purpose’ was highlighted by Lord Chancellor 
Halsbury in Pemsel’s case itself. The Lord Chancellor saw no difficulty with a broad interpretation of 
the doctrine of charitable purpose for defining the jurisdiction of the court for regulatory purposes, 
but considered a different definition should apply to the granting of favours such as income tax 
exemption.4
                                                          
3 P Luxton, The Law of Charities (Oxford University Press, 2001) 30. 
  This is an important distinction. Is charity being defined for scoping of the jurisdiction 
of the Charities Commission of New Zealand or is it being defined as the gateway to taxation favours, 
or it being defined for both reasons? If both, then there will be a tension whenever New Zealand 
society wishes to regulate but not favour, and this cannot be resolved easily, as long as one 
definition must discharge two purposes. The tension has been at the heart of the common law 
4 Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 542 (Lord Halsbury). 
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definition for over 100 years. It arises because for regulatory purposes the definition might quite 
reasonably be broader than the list of entities entitled to tax exemption or tax deductibility.5
The separation of regulation from favours does not necessarily require a legislative division.  There is 
room for development of the common law in such a way that there are at least two readings of 
charitable purpose. The simpler path is through legislation.  These two different readings of 
charitable purpose logically follow the two quite different functions being fulfilled at law by the 
doctrine of charitable purpose mentioned above.  A broad reading logically applies to the defining of 
a jurisidiction which regulates charities.  For example, all charities, that fall within this definition will 
be under the jurisdiction of the New Zealand Charities Commission,but these charities need not all 
be entitled to the same favours.   
 As 
being a charity has tended to bring with it both regulation and favours, the two are understandably 
intertwined, but this need not occur. It is a threshold issue for legal development of the law applying 
to charities in New Zealand.   
A narrow reading may be appropriate in the situation where the doctrine determines entitlement to 
favour. For example, not all regulated charities need enjoy the same favours.  Some may enjoy only 
exemption from taxation while others enjoy exemption and deductibility. So the legislation granting 
favours describes different tests for the organisations entitled to them. For example, to enjoy 
deductible gift recipient status, charities in Singapore, South Africa and Australia must satisfy tests of 
publicness and benevolence; the remainder only enjoy exemption. This will be taken up for 
comment in the next section. 
The implication of this for New Zealand society is that there is a basis for separating exemption and 
deductibility taxation issues from charitable purpose, at least generally. One definition of charitable 
purpose could apply for the purpose of defining the jurisdiction of the New Zealand 
Charities Commission and another could apply to determine entitlement to taxation favours.  
Conceptually, this division is an important threshold, and will become increasingly marked as the 
paper proceeds into more progressive alternatives.  It is a division that began in New Zealand with 
the creation of the Charities Commission, by which the regulatory function was explicitly excised 
from the favouring. Lord Cross considered understanding this division was central to an 
                                                          
5 Throughout this paper the expression ‘tax deductibility’ is used as a shorthand for the benefit 
received by donors to a charity entitling them to deduct the amount of their donations from their 
income before the amount of tax payable is calculated, e.g. Income Tax Act 2004 ss BD 2, DV 8 and 
DV 9. For other examples of such favours see: in Australia, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), 
Div 30; US, Internal Revenue Code ss 501(c)(3) and 170; UK, Income Tax Act 2007 c 3, ss 521–523; 
Canada, Income Tax Act (1985) c 1 (5th Supp) ss 110.1(1)(a)(ii), 118.1(1)(b) and s 118.1(3), and 
149(1)(l)). 
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understanding of twentieth century charity law.6  Even if it is not a division that presently informs 
the doctrine of charitable purpose, it can be discerned from the methodology applied in Pemsel’s 
case, but not by focusing exclusively on Lord Macnaghten’s classification.  Following this approach, a 
gift for a purpose which is not charitable, for example a gift for a superstitious or indifferent 
purpose, could be recognised as a purpose gift, but entitlement to the favours available to charitable 
purpose trusts could be declined.7
                                                          
6 Dingle v Turner and Ors [1972] AC 601, 625, but note that the majority expressly rejected this. See 
also J Warburton, D Morris and NF Riddle, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 3. It has been 
explicitly acknowledged as relevant in Canada: AYSA Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada 
(Revenue Agency) 2007 SCC 42.   
 These issues are discussed in the next section where the defence 
of the status quo is explored.   
7 Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves Jr 522; see also AJ Hirsch, 'Bequests for Purposes: A 
Unified Theory' (1999) 33 Washington and Lee Law Review 62.   
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Option One: The Status Quo 
When it established the Charities Commission by Act of Parliament as an Autonomous Crown Entity 
(ACE), the New Zealand government set up a regulatory agency separate from its taxing agency.  To 
define the scope of the regulatory agency’s powers it relied only upon the common law definition of 
charitable purpose to define the Commission’s jurisdiction.8
From as far back as 1979, Barbados had begun the tradition of adding to the definition of charitable 
purpose by statute.  Australia had already passed legislation extending the definition of charitable 
purpose under the Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004. The debate was raging in Great Britain, 
over the statutory extension of charitable purposes; and the Charities Act 2006 added 13 heads of 
charitable purpose to the law for England and Wales. Nevertheless New Zealand elected not to 
follow that lead in the Charities Act 2005.  The question to be asked now is: should the status quo 
remain? In this section we discuss continuing with this ‘common law only’ approach to the definition 
of charitable purpose.   
 Other jurisdictions had added to the 
common law definition but New Zealand did not follow that path.  
This option is put forward, not only because it is presently working at least satisfactorily, but also 
because it is a benchmark against which all alternatives must be measured and shown to be an 
improvement. The status quo has 400 years of history to commend it. There is a long line of case law 
evidencing the capacity of the law to develop incrementally by analogy from existing charitable 
purposes. The fact that other jurisdictions have moved to augment this development by statute 
suggests that, at least in some jurisdictions, this approach is inadequate. If the status quo is to 
continue then it must be able to meet the challenge of continuing to develop without statutory 
assistance. This challenge is therefore taken up now.  
Two issues are considered in this section. They illustrate how the status quo approach of developing 
the common law in the usual way might meet the challenges  brought forward by those arguing the 
need for statutory intervention. The first is the issue of public benefit and the second is political 
purposes. The conclusion to which we will come is that the idea of maintaining the common law only 
approach can be defended in New Zealand in the twenty-first century.   
                                                          
8 For a discussion of the way that the common law was imported and continues to operate see 
Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated v Charities Commission [2011] NZHC 77 (6 May 2011) 
[34]–[40] (Heath J). 
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Public benefit 
The pursuit of public benefit purposes is the overarching characteristic of charities and they are 
granted favours because they provide public benefits.9  In New Zealand and other common law 
countries there are at least two significant fiscal favours: income tax exemption10 and deductibility.11
The New Zealand legislation addresses this concern regarding private benefit directly.  Under the 
Charities Act 2005 the courts are obliged to undertake an enquiry into both public and private 
benefit. To be registered as a charity in New Zealand, a charity must not only show the usual 
common law characteristics, but it must also demonstrate that it is not for private benefit.
  
There is concern across the common law world that fiscal favours attaching to charities are being 
extended to organisations that purport to be charities under one of the first three heads of Pemsel’s 
case, but in fact appear to operate for private benefit. This has brought the presumption of public 
benefit extended to these organisations under intense scrutiny.  The response in common law 
jurisdictions has been quite different. These responses are now discussed.  
12 This has 
led to the development of a jurisprudence in New Zealand which explicitly weighs public and private 
benefit in assessing whether or not an organisation is pursuing an exclusively charitable purpose. 
Justice Mackenzie, relying upon the decision of Justice Simon France in Re The Grand Lodge of 
Antient Free and Accepted Freemasons13, explained the way this process operates in New Zealand 
jurisprudence in the following way: ‘the assessment is a situation-specific analysis of the relative 
relationship between public and private benefits’.14
                                                          
9 Re New Zealand Computer Society Inc. (High Court of New Zealand, Mackenzie J, 28 February 
2011) [13]. See also H Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 
1999) 19–20; J Warburton, D Morris and NF Riddle, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 7; 
Charity Commission for England and Wales, Charities and Public Benefit: The Charity Commission's 
General Guidance on Public Benefit (2008); Charity Commission for England and Wales, 
Commentary on the Descriptions of Charitable Purpose in the Charities Act 2006 (2007); PS Atiyah, 
‘Public Benefit in Charities’ (1958) 21 Modern Law Review 138.   
 This approach, which has express regard to 
private benefits, bears some similarity to the approach taken to entitlement to exemption and 
deductibility in the United States under sections 501(c)(3) and 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. This 
express reference to private benefit as a disqualifying factor is not the most common response. By 
10 Income Tax Act 2004 s CW 36. For other examples of such favours, see Australia: Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), Div 50; US: Internal Revenue Code s 501(c)(3); UK: Income Tax Act 
2007 c 3; Canada: Income Tax Act (1985) c 1 (5th Supp).  
11 Income Tax Act 2004 ss BD 2, DV 8 and DV 9. For other examples of such favours see Australia: 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), Div 30; US: Internal Revenue Code ss 501(c)(3) and 170; 
UK: Income Tax Act 2007 c 3, ss 521–523; Canada: Income Tax Act (1985) c 1 (5th Supp) 
ss 110.1(1)(a)(ii), 118.1(1)(b) and s 118.1(3), and 149(1)(l)).  
12 Charities Act 2005 s 13 provides the following as essential requirements:  
(b) in the case of a society or an institution, the society or institution— 
(i) is established and maintained exclusively for charitable purposes; and 
(ii) is not carried on for the private pecuniary profit of any individual; … 
13 [2010] NZHC 1723 (23 September 2010) [44]. 
14 Re New Zealand Computer Society Inc (High Court of New Zealand, Mackenzie J, 28 February 
2011) [16]. 
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way of passing comment we note that the New Zealand cases do not suggest that they have taken 
cognizance of the way in which private benefit has been theorised in the United States. This is a 
matter that could be explored further by the New Zealand Charities Commission. We do not 
recommend that the US jurisprudence be followed – it has its own context and challenges – but as a 
body of law it could be informative.15
What then is the approach to public benefit elsewhere in the common law world? 
 
Australia has a two tiered approach that does not statutorily reference private benefit. As noted 
above, only some charities in Australia enjoy deductibility status – those that are also public 
benevolent institutions – the remainder only enjoy exemption.16 This statutory division of charities 
into two groups for the purposes of accessing income tax favours arose in 1927, after the Privy 
Council overruled the High Court’s common law solution to the problem of distinguishing between 
entities entitled to different exemptions.17 To address uncertainty about the meaning to be applied 
to ‘charitable institutions’ in different taxing Acts, the Australian parliament enacted legislation that 
distinguished between classes of charity entitled only to exemption and those also able to give 
deductible receipts.18
This two tiered approach has been followed in Singapore, where charities known as Institutions of 
Public Character are able to grant deductible receipts.
 There is no express statutory reference to exclusion of private benefit.  
19
South Africa has abandoned the idea of referencing charitable purpose in tax. It repealed reference 
to ‘charitable’ as a ground for exemption on 19 July 2000.  It elected to directly reference and define 
‘public benefit organisation’ and allowed deductibility for specific expenditures such as 
environmental waste disposal.
  
20 It has therefore avoided problems with the definition of charitable 
purpose by simply referring to public benefit only for tax purposes. As to regulation of charities; this 
issue is avoided by there not being a requirement to register in South Africa. There have been some 
calls for a Charities Commission but that route has not been followed.21
                                                          
15 For a summary of US developments see John Colombo, ‘In Search of Private Benefit’ (2006) 58(5) 
Florida Law Review 1063. 
  
16 Compare Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 30-45 Item 4.1.1, and s 50-5.   
17 Chesterman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1923) 32 CLR 362 (HC); Chesterman v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (1925) 37 CLR 317 (PC) 
18 A O’Connell, 'Charitable Treatment? – A (Potted) History of the Taxation of Charities in Australia' 
(Paper presented at the Tax History Conference 2010, Cambridge, 5–6 July 2010) 21. 
19 Charities Act (Chapter 37); Charities (Institutions of a Public Character) Regulations 2007. 
20 GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 534; and South Africa: Income Tax 
Act 1962 ss 10(CN), 30(1) and 37B. 
21 Yvonne Morgan, ‘The Potential for an Independent Regulatory Authority for NGOs in South Africa’ 
(2005) 7(3) International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 
http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol7iss3/art_1.htm. 
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India is also expected to abandon reference to ‘charitable’ when its new Direct Taxes Code 2010 
comes into effect, expected to be on 1 April 2012.22
In Ireland, where the most recent legislative additions have been made, the legislation defining 
charities is expressly stated not to have fiscal impact.
   
23
In England and Wales, exemption and deductibility both attach to charitable purpose.  The Charities 
Act 2006 removed the common law presumptions as to public benefit, but problems are emerging 
over the statutory definition of public benefit.  Anticipated problems with inadequate drafting have 
materialised amid allegations of politicisation of the Charity Commission’s function.
   
24 In debates 
leading up to the passage of the Charities Bill both the then government and the opposition gave 
commitments to review the public benefit provisions three years after implementation of the 
legislation. The Act was implemented in April 2008 making the due date for review April 2011. 
Notwithstanding this commitment, following the 2010 General Election the newly appointed 
Attorney General, Dominic Grieve QC, referred a case, of his own motion, to the First-tier Tribunal 
(Charity) seeking clarification.25
This international overview raises a number of options for New Zealand to consider. An argument 
can be made for continuing the status quo in the short to medium term.  In the light of the 
controversy currently in the UK, it might be prudent for New Zealand to watch the developments in 
England and Wales before embarking on a journey into statutory regulation of public benefit. As the 
litigation in Britain is driven by a particular reading of the concept of public benefit taken by the 
Charity Commission, and that issue does not arise in New Zealand, an argument can be made for not 
legislating a definition at present.  The New Zealand courts have a workable requirement under the 
Charities Act that applicants prove that a charity operates exclusively for a charitable purpose that is 
 This matter has been driven by a particular construction of the 
concept of public benefit taken by the Charity Commission following the need to prove public 
benefit after the Charities Act 2006 came into force. The case was heard in May 2011 and a decision 
is pending. Given the importance of the issue to this body of jurisprudence in the United Kingdom 
the matter may well be appealed. So there is some controversy in the UK over both the scope and 
operation of the Charities Act and the role being discharged by the Charity Commission, and the 
issues are working their way through both parliamentary review processes and the courts.  
                                                          
22 Direct Taxes Code Bill 2009; see also KW Simon, ‘International Non-Governmental Organizations 
and Non-Profit Organizations’ (2010) 44 International Lawyer 399 at footnote 34; NH Dadrawala, 
’Difficult Times Ahead for Charities in India’ (2009) 7(4) International Journal of Civil Society Law 57. 
23 Charities Act 2009 s 7(1). 
24 P Luxton, ‘Making Law? Parliament v The Charity Commission’ (2009) 64 Politeia 1.   
25 Her Majesty’s Attorney General, Questions for Reference by HM Attorney-General to Tribunal 
under para 2(1)(a) of Schedule 1D to the Charities Act 1993, CRF/2010/0001 (28 September 2010). 
See also, S Cook, ‘Attorney General Refers Charity Commission’s Public Benefit Guidance to the 
Courts’, Third Sector, 9 September 2010, http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/news/Article/1031979/Attorney-
General-refers-Charity-Commissions-public-benefit-guidance-courts/.   
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not conducted for private profit. That is not to say that these other alternatives are without merit. 
Only that none of the options pursued in other jurisdictions show clear superiority to the way that 
challenges arising from the public benefit presumption are managed currently in New Zealand. 
What, though, of areas where New Zealand society may wish to develop the common law?  Is that 
possible? We will now consider political purposes as a gateway to that discussion.    
Political and charitable purposes  
Can the common law continue to develop in line with the social expectations of New Zealand society 
as case law, or is it stymied? The common law position in New Zealand, traceable through the Court 
of Appeal decision of Molloy v Commissioner of Inland Revenue26 back to the Privy Council decision 
in Bowman v Secular Society27 is that political purposes are not charitable and this body of law is 
controversial. There have been three recent decisions on political purposes that provide an excellent 
focus for a discussion of the capacity of the New Zealand law of charities to develop without the 
need for statutory intervention. On 15 February 2011 in Re Draco Foundation (NZ) Charitable Trust 
Ronald Young J of the High Court affirmed that the pursuit of advocacy and political purposes is not a 
charitable purpose in New Zealand.28 This decision was handed down with knowledge of the 
Australian High Court decision in Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation, handed down 
on 1 December 2010.29  In Aid/Watch the Court developed the common law in Australia to allow 
that the pursuit of political purposes in more than an incidental or ancillary way was no longer 
presumed to be inconsistent with the pursuit of a  charitable purpose. However, on 6 May 2011 in 
the Greenpeace case, Heath J in New Zealand’s High Court ‘with a degree of reluctance’ felt 
‘constrained to apply the full extent of the Bowman line of authority on the basis that [he] was 
bound to do so by the Court of Appeal decision in Molloy’.30 Clearly, different directions are being 
taken on either side of the Tasman in relation to the public benefit ‘in the generation by lawful 
means of public debate’.31
                                                          
26 [1981] 1 NZLR 688. 
  One New Zealand commentator, Mark Van Dadelszen, considers that the 
way the Charities Commission approached this issue in Re Draco, and the way that the Court decided 
the case were regressive and limited legal developments.  
27 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406. 
28 High Court of New Zealand, Ronald Young J, 15 February 2011. 
29 (2010) 272 ALR 417. 
30 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated [2011] NZHC 77 (6 May 2011) [59]. 
31 Re Draco Foundation (NZ) Charitable Trust (High Court of New Zealand, Ronald Young J, 15 
February 2011) [57]. 
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In argument in the case, the Charities Commission pointed out to the Court that the law as laid down 
by the Privy Council in Bowman v Secular Society32
[58] The difficulty for the [foundation] in such an approach is that contrary to the law of 
Australia New Zealand does have, as part of its law, a general doctrine which excludes from 
charitable purposes, political objects.  
 is currently the law in New Zealand and that a 
New Zealand court is bound to follow it.  As Justice Ronald Young stated:  
[59] I agree with the Commissioner that Bowman remains good law in New Zealand which I 
must follow.33
That case makes it clear that the issues to be considered were properly ventilated and Ronald Young 
J reached a different decision from the Australian High Court based on his understanding of the 
constitutional differences between Australia and New Zealand. Mark Von Dadelszen, has argued that 
the Australian High Court reasoning ‘can be mounted in any democratic country’ and expressed 
concern that the effect of the Charities Commission’s approach affirmed in the Court’s decision ‘has 
altered perceptions and arguably the law’.
  
34
So does this unwillingness of two High Court judges to develop the common law of New Zealand by 
following Australian developments mean that the law of New Zealand is ‘stultified’?
 However, following the Greenpeace case, whether 
those concerns remain justified is moot.  In that case, Heath J stated that unlike Ronald Young J, he 
had ‘no real concerns that the political system in Australia ought to bring about a different 
conclusion’ from that in New Zealand.  
35
The cost of running actions in appellate courts, and the risk of costs orders against the charity if 
unsuccessful can dissuade charities from advancing cases through the appeal process. This could 
have the practical effect of stultifying the common law’s development in this area.  Two possible 
practical responses can be made. The first is evident in the Greenpeace case. Heath J did not follow 
the usual rule that the successful party should be awarded costs, instead deciding: ‘As the issues 
raised were of some public importance, I make no order as to costs’.
 Not at all, at 
least not as a matter of law. It is the proper process for legal development. Single judges are bound 
by the decisions of superior courts. The cases are evidence of the proper processes for common law 
development in New Zealand.  What is needed is a decision of a court that can overrule Molloy. This 
brings us to the qualification noted above: ‘at least not as a matter of law’.  
36
                                                          
32 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406. 
 This is a precedent that New 
Zealand courts could choose to follow wherever the issues in this area of law were of ‘some public 
33 Re Draco Foundation (NZ) Charitable Trust (High Court of New Zealand, Ronald Young J, 15 
February 2011) [58]–[59]. 
34 Mark Van Dadelszen, ‘Charities and Societies’ NZ Lawyer (11 March 2011) 14. 
35 The term used in Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 272 ALR 417, [30] 
and [41] 
36 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated [2011] NZHC 77 (6 May 2011) [34]–[78].  
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importance’. But the issue need not be up to a decision of the court. There is nothing to stop parties 
such as the Charities Commission agreeing with any charity with which it is in litigation that the 
parties will not seek costs, whatever the outcome. A second option utilised by the Australian 
Taxation Office to advance cases that develop the tax law is test case funding. The Charities 
Commission could also fund charities to advance cases that raise issues ‘of some public importance’ 
through to the appellate courts.  Advancing cases to appeal is, a practical problem not a problem 
with the law, and practical problems can be met with practical solutions. The problem of lack of 
appeals to develop the law can be met with funding. It does not oblige the New Zealand people to 
rely upon statutory amendment to ensure that its charity law keeps step with contemporary New 
Zealand values.  
In summary then, the issue of public and private benefit, whilst controversial seems to be managed, 
at least satisfactorily under the combination of statutory private benefit exclusions and case law 
developments.  The myriad international responses to this problem are offered as alternatives but 
none stand out as exemplary. The status quo could continue. It has 400 years of history to commend 
it and on two of the more controversial areas discussed there are at least adequate responses that 
can be made in defence of the status quo.   
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Option Two: Pemsel Plus 
The Pemsel plus proposal is essentially the same as the status quo but with other purposes added to 
the definition of charitable purpose by legislation, as needed from time to time.  
The background to this approach is that a little over a decade ago England and Wales led common 
law countries on a journey into statutory reform of the law of charities.37  The promise was of a new 
legal framework.38  Arguably what was delivered fell well short of that and New Zealand did not 
follow this trend.  Before the legislative reform in those other jurisdictions common law jurisdictions 
had the common law’s three principal divisions of charitable purpose and a catch-all.  Through 
legislative reforms those common law countries added variously between zero and 12 statutory 
divisions and a catch-all.39  As Dunn and Riley warned in 2004 the reclassification with additional 
statutory divisions ‘will inevitably lead to a burgeoning final category and, eventually, to the same 
criticisms that beset the current [prelegislation] regime’.40  At best this form of legislative 
intervention could only postpone the need for a new legal framework.41
On the other hand it may be argued that even if these amendments did not resolve all of the 
problems they have at least addressed some of them. Australia
   
42 Barbados,43 England and Wales,44 
Ireland,45 Northern Ireland,46 and Scotland,47
                                                          
37 The beginning was P Woodfield et al, Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of the Law of Charities: 
Report to the Home Secretary and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury (1987). Barbados had 
moved to a statutory definition in 1979 but this did not trigger the widespread interest in statutory 
reform. See Barbados: Charities Act 1979 Volume VIII, Title XVIII, Chapter 243.   
 have passed legislation defining or extending the 
common law definition of charitable purpose.  Schedule 1 to this paper sets out the sections where 
an extended definition appears in each of these jurisdictions. A different approach has been taken in 
the United States where a long list of exempt and deductible entities has been included in the 
Internal Revenue Code.  These are set out in Schedule 2.  In Singapore, statute defines the concept of 
an ‘Institution of  a Public Character’ by focusing on activities that ‘are exclusively beneficial to the 
community in Singapore as a whole and are not confined to sectional interests or groups of persons 
based on race, belief or religion’.  These provisions are set out in Schedule 3. One of the options for 
38 United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Home Department, Charities: A Framework for the 
Future (1989).   
39 Australia: Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004 (Cth); Barbados: Charities Act 1979 Volume 
VIII, Title XVIII, Chapter 243; UK: Charities Act 2006 (Eng.&W) c 50; Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 
2008 c 12; Charities and Trustees Investment (Scotland) Act 2005; Ireland: Charities Act 2009.   
40 A Dunn and C Riley, ‘Supporting the Not-For-Profit Sector: the Government’s Review of Charitable 
and Social Enterprise’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 632, 644.   
41 Ibid.  
42 Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004 (Cth). 
43 Charities Act 1979 Volume VIII, Title XVIII, Chapter 243.  
44 Charities Act 2006 c 50, Part 1. 
45 Charities Act 2009 s 7. 
46 Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 c 12, Part 1. 
47 Charities and Trustees Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 asp 10, s 7. 
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New Zealand is to identify purposes which are presently excluded from the definition of charitable 
purpose at common law, and add these by statute to extend the scope of the Charities Commission’s 
jurisdiction.  In so doing it could adopt any of these approaches or a combination. For example the 
definition of charitable purpose might be extended, but certain benefits might be limited to 
organisations that satisfy a definition similar to that of Singapore’s Institutions of Public Character.  
As an example of extending the definition we set out below the central operative part of the 
Charities Act 2006, for England and Wales.  The meaning of charitable purpose is included in Part 1: 
2 Meaning of "charitable purpose"  
(1) For the purposes of the law of England and Wales, a charitable purpose is a purpose 
which—  
(a) falls within subsection (2), and  
(b) is for the public benefit….  
(2) A purpose falls within this subsection if it falls within any of the following descriptions of 
purposes–  
(a) the prevention or relief of poverty;  
(b) the advancement of education;  
(c) the advancement of religion;  
(d) the advancement of health or the saving of lives;  
(e) the advancement of citizenship or community development;  
(f) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science;  
(g) the advancement of amateur sport;  
(h) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the 
promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity;  
(i) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement;  
(j) the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial 
hardship or other disadvantage;  
(k) the advancement of animal welfare;  
(l) the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown, or of the 
efficiency of the police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services;  
(m) any other purposes within subsection (4).  
 
Part 1 includes further guidance as to public benefit. We have included those provisions in Schedule 
1.48
                                                          
48 See 1.2 England and Wales. 
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Extending favours such as tax deductibility only to some charities, would involve New Zealand 
amending the relevant taxing statute.  
In summary, there is a long list of possible purposes that could be added by statute to the common 
law definition of charitable purpose. These additions might not address all concerns expressed by 
New Zealanders, but they will address some.  We have provided models in the Schedules to this 
paper.  If New Zealand were to take such an approach it would be following an example set by many 
other common law jurisdictions.  This approach has adoption across many jurisdictions to commend 
it. 
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Option Three: Identify the Spirit and Intendment 
This proposal seeks to identify the essence of the Preamble with a view to replacing it with modern 
language. This could do away with the need for lists of purposes. At present charitable purposes are 
defined as purposes falling within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble and for public benefit.  
In this section we set out a basis for replacing reference to the spirit and intendment of the 
Preamble with reference to altruism and voluntarism.  Put in legislative terms and following the 
model of the legislation for England and Wales the drafting might read as follows: 
2 Meaning of "charitable purpose"  
(1) For the purposes of the law of New Zealand, a charitable purpose is a purpose which—  
(a) is pursued altruistically, 
(b) is pursued voluntarily, and  
(b) is for the public benefit. 
Further definition sections could then develop the meaning of these words to ensure that they 
captured New Zealand society’s values.  The above sets out a method to develop the law by 
statutory amendment. This development is possible from within the common law by returning to 
the reasoning in Pemsel’s case. We do not set out those arguments completely here but introduce 
key concepts to sketch how the developments could occur.49
Reference to spirit and intendment is critical to the current law because it avoids the need to refer 
to motive. By adopting the technical definition, the reference to motive is removed and charities are 
institutions that satisfy certain ‘objective’ criteria.
  
50
The majority of the Court of Appeal tell [the Special Commissioners vested with the task of 
deciding what is a charitable institution for tax exemption purposes under the English 
Income Tax Act (1842)] they must be guided by the popular meaning of ‘charity’, and that 
‘each individual case must be decided on its own facts.’  There is certainly no indication in 
the Act that such a hopeless task as that was laid on the Special Commissioners.
 In adopting the technical meaning Lord 
Macnaghten held that: 
51
The law has consistently returned to the Preamble to overcome this difficulty but as the doctrine of 
charitable purpose has become focused on the institution (not the altruistic characteristic) it bears 
little, if any, link to common parlance. If the legal class of charities does not represent the values of 
New Zealand society’s expectations of charitable purpose, what do New Zealand citizens expect to 
   
                                                          
49 For more detail as to how this could be done, see MD Turnour, Beyond Charity: Outlines of a 
Jurisprudence for Civil Society (PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2009), 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/31742/; see particularly chapters VIII and IX. 
50 Gino Dal Pont, Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 2000) 8–13; 
Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583 (Lord Macnaghten).   
51 Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 587.   
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reside at the heart of this body of law?  Case law from Canada points to altruism and voluntarism 
and given the cultural similarities between New Zealand and Canada this may provide a useful line of 
inquiry. Justice Gonthier summarised the law on this point in Vancouver Society of Immigrant 
Women: 
Two central principles have long been embedded in the case law.  Speaking of the existing 
Pemsel categories, Rand J. observed …, that ‘the attributes attaching to all are their 
voluntariness and, directly or indirectly, their reflex on public welfare’.  These two principles, 
namely, (1) voluntariness (or what I shall refer to as altruism, that is, giving to third parties 
without receiving anything in return other than the pleasure of giving); and (2) public 
welfare or benefit in an objectively measurable sense, underlie the existing categories of 
charitable purposes, and should be the touchstones guiding their further development.52
Justice Gonthier effectively equated voluntariness and altruism.  Nothing is lost by referring to 
voluntariness and altruism as coterminous when considering the role of charitable purpose as one of 
determining favour such as entitlement to income tax exemption or deductibility which was the 
question before the court in that case. For the purposes of determining the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the Charities Commission of New Zealand we suggest that when defining charities it is helpful to 
keep the two concepts separate. This is because charities are distinguished from government 
organisations by voluntariness, but it is altruism that distinguishes them from businesses. We now 
discuss these two concepts very briefly.  
  
Altruism 
In Pemsel’s case Lord Macnaghten said that the foundation of the concept of charitable use is not in 
the categories he listed, nor in the Preamble per se but in ‘the piety of early times’.53
George Lewes introduced the word ‘altruism’ into the English language in 1853 with his translation 
of Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences.
 This piety, and 
its expression through pious uses, or charitable purpose trusts as they are commonly known, can be 
argued to find expression in contemporary English as ‘altruism’.  
54 The Oxford English Dictionary defines altruism as: 
‘[D]evotion to the welfare of others, regard for others, as a principle of action; opposed to egoism or 
selfishness’.55 In psychology and sociology, it is part of a broader class called ‘prosocial behaviour’.56
                                                          
52 Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v MNR (1999) 169 DLR (4th) 34, 57–
58. 
 
53 Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583 (Lord Macnaghten). 
54 G Lewes, Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences (G Lewes trans, 1890 ed). Comte evidently invented 
the word, possibly drawing upon a French legal phrase Alteri huic; he intended ‘to establish the 
opposite reference point to the self-gratifying, utility-maximising “economic man” of economic theory’: 
see H Anheier and R List, A Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and the Non-Profit Sector (2005) 
6. Note also the similarity with Italian word ‘altrui’ meaning ‘others’.   
55 JA Simpson and ESC Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, 1989).  
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If altruism is accepted as a rough equivalent of pious use, reference to the ‘spirit and intendment’ of 
the Preamble or the four heads of Pemsel’s case is not necessary.   
There are difficulties with this approach.  Defining ‘pious use’ in the context of the law as it was 
before the passing of the Statute of Elizabeth is not a straightforward exercise; consequently it is not 
an easy step to altruism. That is not because a simple legal definition cannot be set out, but rather 
because the bare definition of ‘pious use’ or altruism without explanation denudes the idea of value. 
It must be remembered that the idea of charity in the Preamble was an idea anchored in notions of 
civil relations which preceded the present property rights discourse that has dominated modernity.  
It may seem strange in twenty-first New Zealand to be focused on the use to which something is put, 
rather than on the title or right to use it. There is now a widely accepted belief that once something 
is ‘owned’ the owner may do as he or she pleases with it, regardless of moral constraints.57 The 
concept of pious use belongs to a different moral frame.58 Both words, ‘pious’ and ‘use’ are 
important.59 The ‘use’ must be directed to others who are in need; the motive must be generosity, 
as opposed to self-interest. A focus on why people give is fundamentally a focus on the supply side 
of the transaction, but the reason for supply is manifest in the form of beneficiary to whom the 
transfer is made.60
Lord Watson, whose reasoning was accepted by a majority on this point in Pemsel’s case
 The others benefiting in a charitable sense are the public.  These ideas can be 
seen in Pemsel’s case but they are not developed in the same way as the four principal divisions set 
out by Lord Macnaghten.  A more radical and variant reading would have to be developed from 
other judgments in Pemsel’s case, such as those of Lords Watson and Herschell. 
61
So far as I am able to discover, ‘godly’ and ‘pious’ as applied to trusts or uses, had, in early 
times much the same significance in Scotland as in England.  Their meaning was not limited 
 found not 
just public benefit, but also ‘pious’ motive to be integral to the concept of charitable purpose at law: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
56 G Vaughan and M Hogg, Introduction to Social Psychology (Prentice Hall, 1998) 324; D Shaffer, 
Social and Personality Development (Wadsworth, 2000) 306.   
57 M Turnour, The Stewardship Paradigm: an Enquiry into the Ethical Obligation Associated with 
being in Control of Resources (MA Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 1999), 48. 
58 FW Maitland, ‘The Origin of Uses’ (1894) 8 Harvard Law Review 127.   
59 The Christian foundation for the terms appears in the following passage by Augustine: ‘but in you 
let the love of riches grow cold, and let a pious use of what property you possess be directed to 
spiritual delights, that your liberality wax warm rather in helping such as are in want than in enriching 
covetous persons’: Saint Augustine, Of the Good of Widowhood (CL Cornish trans, unknown year 
[trans of: De Bono Viduitatis] New Advent) http://www.newadvent.org /fathers/1311.htm.   
60 See, e.g. Sacerdotii Nostri Primordia, Encyclical of Pope John XXIII On August 1, 1959 (Papal 
Encyclicals Online, 2000–2008) http://www.papalencyclicals.net/John23/j23sacer.htm. 
61 Lord Halsbury concurred with the reasoning of Lord Watson on the meaning of Godly and pious 
informing the understanding of charitable purpose: ‘That “godly” and “pious” are convertible terms, 
and may be so treated, is true’ Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 549. Lord Bramwell agreed with the 
reasoning although he came to a different decision: at 563. Lord Herschell agreed with both Lord 
Watson’s reasoning and his conclusion: at 574.   
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to objects of a religious or eleemosynary character, but embraced all objects which a well-
disposed person might promote from motives of philanthropy.62
In relation to the word ‘pious’ Lord Watson gave three examples: ‘the building and repairing of 
bridges, repairing of churches or entertainment of the poor’.
 
63  He referred also to the case of Lord 
Saltoun v Lady Pitsligo64 where ‘the Court of Session held that the repair of a public harbour was a 
pious use’ within the meaning of the relevant legislation. His point was clear: if a ‘well-disposed 
person’ was motivated by ‘philanthropy’ the courts could find charitable intent, as the traditional 
conception of pious use or godliness had broad application. Lord Watson did not just point to 
motives of philanthropy leading to the provision of physical needs, but also held that those motives 
could be to make contributions to religious,65 intellectual and moral culture.66
Lord Herschell also wrote his own opinion, whilst agreeing with Lord Macnaghten,. He did not 
categorise charitable purposes into the four heads, but referenced a motive of benevolence as 
integral to charitable purpose: 
 
I think, then, that the popular conception of a charitable purpose covers the relief of any 
form of necessity, destitution, or helplessness which excites the compassion or sympathy of 
men, and so appeals to their benevolence for relief.67
The reasons for setting out these judgments, in part, is to show that altruism – or at least reference 
to philantropic motive, has a long history traceable to impeccable foundations.  Pious uses or 
charitable purposes are not just public benefiting purposes. They also have as a central dimension, 
motive to benefit others. This is not the orthodox reading of the law as it presently stands.
   
68 Ignoring 
motive is justified under the doctrine of charitable purpose because the focus is entirely on the 
recipient – the demand side – not on the supplier. Focusing on the supply side as well as the demand 
side overcomes the problems which flowed from looking only to public benefit. It is an approach 
that has assisted economists69
                                                          
62 Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 558 (Lord Watson), [emphasis added]. 
 and might assist New Zealand in the development of the law. To re-
focus in this way requires taking up a concept that is not often considered in the current 
jurisprudence. Voluntarism is altruism’s partner in this third alternative approach.   
63 Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 559 (Lord Watson). 
64 M Dict 9948. 
65 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 558 (Lord Watson). 
66 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 561 (Lord Watson). 
67 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 571-572 (Lord Herschell), [emphasis added].   
68 J Warburton, D Morris and NF Riddle, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 7. 
69 A Ben-Ner and T Van Hoomissen, ‘Nonprofit Organisations in the Mixed Economy: A Demand and 
Supply Analysis’ (1991) 62 Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 519; R Steinberg, ‘Economic 
Theories of Nonprofit Organisations’ in WW Powell and R Steinberg (eds), The Nonprofit Sector: A 
Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 117.   
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Voluntarism 
Something provided voluntarily is clearly not provided under coercion. Citizens provide funds for 
public benefiting purposes when they pay taxes, but those payments are not in pursuit of a 
charitable purpose. Lord Macnaghten stated in that most famous part of his opinion that ‘a layman 
would probably be amused if he were told that a gift to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the 
benefit of the nation was a charity’.70  It is not an absolute rule that a gift to government cannot be 
charitable. In Pemsel’s case Lord Chancellor Halsbury cited a number of authorities to that effect.71  
In Re Cain, a gift to the state government of Victoria (the Department of Health) was held to be for a 
charitable purpose.72 Nevertheless there is a clear dividing line at common law between 
organisations pursuing charitable purposes and governments.73
If the provision of a good is coerced, then it is not supplied charitably. How much coercion is 
tolerable, though, for a purpose to remain charitable?
 Giving for a charitable purpose is 
characterised by voluntariness.   
74 Some funding and perhaps some 
contributions of time result from coercion. A most obvious example is where a charity pursuing 
community service purposes is entirely funded by government and subject to detailed compliance 
requirements and directions (set out in the form of a contract or other form of arrangement).75
There is a growing science in the measurement of altruism.
 Does 
this remove the requisite voluntariness?. At some point between the entirely voluntary pursuit of 
purposes and entirely coerced pursuit of those same purposes, a threshold will be crossed – the 
boundary between charities and government. The New Zealand courts are familiar with this 
weighing process in assessing public and private benefit. Arguably a similar process of weighing 
factors to find which side of the boundary between charity and its other (be it business or 
government) could be adopted in relation to both altruism and voluntarism. 
76 If altruism and voluntarism can be 
identified and measured, then theory development could progress significantly, even into 
quantitative measurement if the Preamble is abandoned and replaced by these concepts.77
                                                          
70 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 584 (Lord Macnaghten). 
 This is 
71 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 544. 
72 In re Cain (decd); The National Trustees Executors Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Jeffrey [1950] 
VLR 382, 387. 
73 Central Bayside General Practice Association Limited v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 
228 CLR 168. 
74 GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010); M Harding, ‘Distinguishing 
Government from Charity in Australian Law’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 559, 559. 
75 Central Bayside General Practice Association Limited v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 
228 CLR 168, 181. 
76 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division, Handbook on Non-
Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts (UNDESA, 2003) 69.   
77 For example at the most basic level, altruism can be measured by volunteering. The UNDESA’s 
Handbook (ibid) sets out a method for valuing volunteer labour input, having regard to the two 
presently dominant methods of opportunity cost and market or replacement cost..   
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not to oblige theory development to move to complex measurement, but the possibility of the 
Charities Commission drawing upon quantitative analysis of both altruism and voluntariness when 
determining entitlement to registration is foreseeable under this approach.78
A third option, then is that New Zealand could move to a definition of charitable purpose that looks 
to altruism, voluntarism and public benefit to evidence charitable purpose.  This approach has the 
advantage of conceptual simplicity.  It can be argued from the case law.  It is a higher level of 
abstraction of the principles and this has advantages and disadvantages. The Preamble no longer has 
any legislative force in Australia,
 This is because 
altruism could be measured in some way. Coercion could be identified by reference to such things as 
the capacity to oblige participation, to require allocation of funds to particular objects, or compel 
delivery of charitable goods.   
79
  
 Canada and other common law countries. It may be argued that 
the time has come for New Zealand to let it go and take up these modern concepts inherent in 
charity as a means of defining it.  
                                                          
78 MD Turnour, Beyond Charity: Outlines of a Jurisprudence for Civil Society (PhD Thesis, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2009) 335, http://eprints.qut.edu.au/31742/.   
79 For discussion of the history generally see: GE Dal Pont, Law of Charity (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2010) 79–126.   
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Option Four: A Nonprofit Sector Approach (with Carve-out)  
This proposal takes cognizance of historical developments in the law and developments in other 
disciplines, particularly economics, to set out an alternative framework for reform. In summary it 
differs from the current common law approach which seeks to list all of the purposes entitled to 
recognition as charitable purposes. This approach identifies the whole nonprofit sector and then 
carves out from it purposes which are not charitable. The net effect can be the same, but the 
approach is quite different. 
The beginning of the argument for this model is New Zealand’s Property Assessment Act 1879. That 
Act set the model for the southern hemisphere and possibly the world  when it made ‘any public 
body society or persons for public charitable or public educational purposes’ and any organisation 
‘not formed wholly or mainly for the purpose of gain or profit’ exempt from its operation.80  
Importantly for the purposes of this discussion this appears to have been the first time exemption 
was extended to ‘all non-profit societies, without reference to “charitable purposes”’.81 This 
legislative approach was followed in South Australia, the first Australian jurisdiction to import the 
exemption, where it was applied to ‘all Companies, Public Bodies, and Societies not carrying on any 
business for the purpose of gain’.82
A charitable purpose is a purpose pursued voluntarily, altruistically and for public benefit.  A 
business, government or family purpose is not a charitable purpose.
 The principle embedded in this approach is that the legislation 
applies to all nonprofit entities and those not intended to be within the class are then carved out. 
Applying this requires a very broad definition such as the one in the Property Assessment Act. To 
adopt this approach now in New Zealand a very broad statutory definition of charitable purpose 
would be needed. It might extend the jurisdiction of the Charities Commission to the borders of the 
whole nonprofit sector which may have appeal to some. Following this 19th century legislative 
model but updating the language, the Charities Commission’s jurisdiction would have this scope if 
the government passed legislation defining charitable purpose as follows: 
83
Simply defining charitable purpose is not sufficient; the definition of charity must be extended. 
Having regard to the definition of charitable purpose, and informed by the discussion under option 3 
above, charity might be defined as follows: 
    
A charity is an organisation that pursues purposes voluntarily, altruistically and for public 
benefit. Charities are distinguished from government organisations by their voluntariness, 
                                                          
80 A O’Connell, 'Charitable Treatment? – A (Potted) History of the Taxation of Charities in Australia' 
(Paper presented at the Tax History Conference 2010, Cambridge, 5–6 July 2010) 4, referring to s 26. 
81 Ibid 4. 
82 Ibid citing Taxation Act 1884 (SA) s 9. 
83 Family is used in this context as an equivalent to household: the smallest private gathering that is 
too personal to be a nonprofit organisation.  
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from businesses by participation being for altruistic purposes, and from family and other 
private groups by the purposes being public.  
Redefined as altruistic, public benefiting, voluntary associations, the legal space defined by reference 
to charitable purpose could become co-terminous with the definition of the nonprofit sector as a 
whole. Organisations to be excluded from the regulatory net could then be carved out. This 
approach is as old as the Statute of Elizabeth which carved out certain entities from the scope of 
regulation. Charitable purpose has been identified as the essence of the sector for centuries. 
Charities are recognised as central to the nonprofit sector and the nonprofit sector is the whole third 
sector – leaving nothing that does not belong to another sector. The nonprofit sector is 
differentiated from business (the first sector); government (the second sector); and family (the 
fourth sector). With this definition, charities now comprise the whole third sector in a four sector 
model of society.  
That does not mean that the whole sector has to be regulated by the Charities Commission. If some 
organisations that would now be caught within the sector should not be so regulated then they can 
be carved out. Instead of a list of purposes included in the definition of charitable there would be a 
list of purposes excluded. For example political purposes might be one example of purposes carved 
out by either the courts or legislation. Political parties obviously might be regulated by other laws. 
Another form of organisation that might be regulated separately is co-operatives, which arguably are 
on the boundary between nonprofit and business.   
This approach, defining the sector and then carving out exceptions, also does not mean that all these 
regulated organisations that might now fall within the definition of ‘charity’ should enjoy the same 
taxation and other favours as charities presently enjoy in New Zealand.  This model may necessitate 
changes to the tax laws as there could be fiscal implications of redefining the organisations included 
within the definition of charities – particularly if it is expanded substantially. This brings us back to 
where we began with a discussion of whether the definition of charitable purpose for regulatory 
purposes necessarily aligns with the definition of charitable purpose for taxation favouring.  We 
make suggestions for managing that distinction in the next and final substantive section of this 
paper. In concluding this section, the critical point is that this fourth model provides a concept for 
regulation of the whole sector (less any carve out) separate from the entitlement of entities to 
taxation favours. It is arguably a redevelopment of a New Zealand idea that preceded Pemsel’s case.  
Justifying the Favours to Charities and Building on the Justification 
The division between the functions of charitable purpose as a basis for defining the jurisdiction of 
the Charities Commission on the one hand and as a gateway to favour on the other commenced this 
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discussion and four models for developing the idea of charitable purpose have been canvassed. At 
the outset it was promised that the justification for favour would be reviewed and ways it which the 
central ideas might be developed would be brought forward. This section is directed to that end. 
First the question is asked: why do charities enjoy favours? Some of the history behind the issue is 
set out but the conclusion reached is that the reasons are clear. The cases and commentary point to 
contribution to public benefit but how the law is to be theorised is disputed.84
Why are charities favoured? 
 If New Zealand is 
satisfied with the way that public benefit is currently applied no change is required. Because this is 
an options paper, two possible alternatives are put forward for discussion.  
Charities have existed and have enjoyed favourable treatment since time immemorial but we do not 
know exactly why. Elaine Abery has observed that the favouring of charities is at least as old as Ezra’s 
return of the exiled Jews.85 Colombo and Hall point to evidence of tax favour for charities in ancient 
Greece, ancient Rome and ancient Egypt:86 ‘Exempting charities from various forms of taxation is a 
practice that appears as old as western civilization itself’.87 The exemption has applied in the United 
Kingdom since William Pitt introduced income taxation.88 New Zealand adopted a similar policy of 
exempting charities which is traceable to the broad exemptions given in 1879 to all nonprofit 
organisations.89 The long history of exemption is clear but the reasons why are not.  One academic 
has observed in relation to the the United States Congress – but the point is true internationall –, 
when governments pass into law this favoured status, they are ‘generally silent about the dispositive 
reasons’.90
If the legislatures are silent, what is the theory? There are various contested views.
   
91
                                                          
84 Guild v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1992] 2 AC 310; Central Bayside General Practice 
Association Limited v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 168, (Kirby J); and AYSA 
Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada (Revenue Agency) 2007 SCC 42 and Commissioner of 
Taxation v Word Investments Limited (2008) 236 CLR 204, 240 where Kirby J (dissenting) said: ‘My 
own attempt to drag this body of law into the twenty-first century, in conformity with modernity and 
applicable general principles, came to nothing’. See also Andrew Murray and Mary O'Donovan, 'One 
Regulator One System One Law: The Case for Introducing a New Regulatory System for the Not for 
Profit Sector' (Parliament of Australia[?], 2006).  
 At a 
foundational level underpinning charities, is a body of law which enables these gifts, which tend to 
85 Elaine Abery, 'Charities: A Target for Ralph' (2000) 29 Australian Tax Review 224, 224 referencing 
The Holy Bible New International Version (1984) Ezra 7:24 . 
86 John Colombo and Mark Hall, The Charitable Tax Exemption (1995) 1, 14.   
87 ibid 3.   
88 J Warburton, D Morris and NF Riddle, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 305. 
89 A O’Connell, 'Charitable Treatment? – A (Potted) History of the Taxation of Charities in Australia' 
(Paper presented at the Tax History Conference 2010, Cambridge, 5-6 July 2010) 4, referring to s 26. 
90 Penina Kessler Lieber, 'United States Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organisations' in Paul Bater, Frits 
Hondius and Penina Kessler Lieber (eds), The Tax Treatment of NGOs: Legal, Ethical and Fiscal 
Frameworks for Promoting NGOs and their Activities (Kluwer, 2004) 173, 180. 
91 ibid, 180–181. 
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public benefit, to take place.92  There is a facilitative function of enabling gifts for public benefit. 
Following this idea leads into a rich debate that has raged within economics since the late 1970s in 
an endeavour to explain what, why and how public goods are provided by charities and other 
nonprofit organisations.93  As public goods are goods supplied to the public at large, as distinct from 
private buyers, applying the concept of markets and the rules of supply and demand to them is 
clearly flawed.94
What then, does it mean to grant favour based on contributions of public benefit? At its base is the 
question: when does an organisation provide sufficient public benefit to justify tax favour or some 
other favour frequently enjoyed by charities across the common law world? Whilst different courts, 
legislators or regulators may draw upon presumptions or different factors to inform them of how 
much or how little public benefit must be evident to be entitled to favours, and different factors may 
be taken into account, or weighed differently, to decide the extent to which public benefit is evident, 
some quite sophisticated criteria for categorising publicness have emerged.
 The Preamble upon which the doctrine of charitable purpose is founded is, 
essentially, a list of public goods. The exemplars of these public goods in the Preamble are the 
‘Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies … Seabanks and Highewaies’. What can be said then is 
that public benefit is central and has been at least since the Preamble was published in 1601. 
95
For the purpose of advancing the discussion we suggest that when the debate is distilled it might be 
that in weighing the publicness of the benefit regard must be had to certain factors such as: 
 These criteria could 
usefully inform the more general principles for developing legal theory.  
1. remoteness, informed by whether or not the persons benefiting are members of the 
organisation, such as members of a club, or are truly independent and therefore genuinely 
the public; and 
2. the size of the group benefiting and whether it may be described as the public as a whole or 
a subsection of it.  The larger the number of people benefiting the more public the purpose.  
All charitable trusts were originally considered public trusts96
                                                          
92 Kerry O'Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion:  An International Study (Routledge, 2007) 1. 
 and if charitable trusts are taken as the 
foundation typology of the voluntary public organisational form for the supply of goods (which they 
were), then charitable purpose resides at one extreme of the ‘benefit continuum’.  At the other end 
are organisational forms which are purely for private purposes. So ranking of public benefit provides 
93 Charles T Coltfelter, The Economics of Giving (1997); Robert Scott Gassler, 'Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Economics: A Critical Survey' (1990) 19 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 
137.   
94 Richard Steinberg, 'Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organisations' in Walter W Powell and Richard 
Steinberg (eds), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 
117; Avner Ben-Ner and Theresa Van Hoomissen, 'Nonprofit Organisations in the Mixed Economy' in 
Benedetto Gui (ed), Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (Blackwell, 1991) 519. 
95 Rob Atkinson, 'Nonprofit Symposium: Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: 
Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses' (1997) 27 Stetson Law Review 395, 565–566.  
96 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531 at 580 (Lord Macnaghten).  
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a basis for legal theory to go beyond the general idea of ‘public’ to a ‘continuum of publicness’.  
Figure 1 illustrates how favouring would depend on where a purpose is positioned on the public 
benefit continuum. The greater the public benefit the greater the favour that can be justified. This is 
our first and simplest model for discussion. 
 
The Preamble also lists such things as the relief of poverty, which, in economic terms, usually 
involves the supply of private goods, such as food, to particular individuals.97  So a basis for division 
between charitable goods that are essentially private and those which are clearly public already 
exists in case law. Rob Atkinson puts it thus: ‘in summary, charities provide primary public benefits in 
two ways: especially good goods to ordinary people, and ordinary goods to the especially 
deserving.’98
This brings us to the second model that we propose. Rather than analysing public benefit as on a 
continuum it can be arranged into classes.  An example of such a classification based on the first 
three heads of Pemsel’s case might be that favour is extended to organisations that pursue public 
benefit by one of three means. 
   
1. Dealing with Disadvantage; 
2. Encouraging Edification; or   
3. Facilitating Freedom. 
                                                          
97 It might be asked where the advancement of religion fits. The repair of churches was listed in the 
Preamble but that has been expanded to advancement of religion as the law is presently understood.  
We would argue that advancement of religion, broadly understood and recast, will be theorised as 
fundamentally a public good. 
98 Rob Atkinson, 'Nonprofit Symposium: Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: 
Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses' (1997) 27 Stetson Law Review 395, 402.   
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Dealing with disadvantage 
The first head of charitable purpose under Pemsel’s case is the relief of poverty.  This generally 
involves the supply of private goods to a person for the purposes of dealing with the disadvantage 
that person experiences. In England and Wales, the Charities Act 2006 lists ‘the relief of those in 
need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage’.99 The 
federal jurisdiction in Australia has added ‘open and nondiscriminatory self help groups’, to the list 
of charitable purposes.100 New Zealand might instead attempt to define this class of charitable 
purpose as ‘dealing with disadvantage’. We suggest that the broader rationale for the class can be 
seen in that it advances equality. The foundation of the common law’s jurisprudential obligation to 
equality under the law is, according to Brooks, traceable to Cicero.101  If the common law is taken to 
have a commitment to equality, then granting favours to those who voluntarily relieve and prevent 
poverty, assisting the weak to join equally with the strong in enjoying society is to encourage that 
which the law itself deigns. As the French Declaration of the Rights of Man put it: ‘all citizens, being 
equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and 
occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and 
talents’.102
Encouraging edification  
 It becomes a function of New Zealanders of goodwill to endeavour to lift all other citizens 
up so that they may enjoy that equality. 
The second head of charitable purpose under Pemsel’s case is advancement of education, a purpose 
that supplies a quasi-public good that, to use Lord MacNaghten’s phrase, benefits ‘the rich as well as 
the poor’.103  Advancement of education, along with other purposes recognised as charitable under 
the fourth head are recognised because they belong to a broad category of quasi-public goods that 
edify society. A category of purposes centring on community development by the provision of quasi-
public goods that ‘benefit the rich as well as the poor’104 is required. Lord Watson identified the class 
with reference to ‘intellectual and moral culture’ and seemed to include advancement of religion.105
To fall within this category a purpose must demonstrate that its advancement leads to a greater 
measure of public benefit than would dealing with disadvantage (where the benefit could be entirely 
private). So the enjoyment of the benefit must be ‘socialised’ at least to sufficently large subsections 
 
‘Encouraging Edification’ is an appropriate way to describe this class of charitable purpose.  
                                                          
99 Charities Act 2006 (Eng.&W) c 50, s 2(2).  
100 Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004 (Cth) ss 4–5.   
101 Christopher W Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society Since 1450 (Hambledon Press, 
1998) 208. 
102 The Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789.  
103 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 583-584 (Lord McNaghten). 
104 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 583-584 (Lord McNaghten). 
105 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 557-559 (Lord Watson). 
 31 
 
of communities to be considered public.106  Purposes that involve the provision of social goods such 
as public art and other cultural activities, are examples. The class would also include the provision of 
physical infrastructure that literally ‘edifies’ a community – the ‘Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies … 
Seabanks and Highewaies’ listed in the Preamble can find their twenty-first century equivalents in 
social infrastructure such as public libraries and museums. The socialisation of goods suggests 
communal sharing and so arguably this class is favoured because it advances fraternity. 
Advancement of fraternity must at least include purposes that edify the ‘intellectual and moral 
culture’. Advancement of religion is also justifiable on this basis but there is reason to treat that 
category of charitable purpose separately.107
Facilitating freedom 
   
The third head of charitable purpose under Pemsel’s case is the advancement of religion. 
Advancement of religion is favoured because of its role in providing the moral foundations for 
western democracies and consequently the foundation for the freedoms upon which the rule of law 
rests. On this basis we can argue for extending the class beyond organisations pursuing the 
advancement of religion, to other organisations that similarly contribute to the common weal.  
Tocqueville observed with reference to the role of religion in the United States: ‘Thus, while the law 
permits the Americans to do what they please, religion prevents them from conceiving, and forbids 
them to commit, what is rash or unjust.’108  His point was that religion operated as a moral restraint 
on unbridled freedom to ensure that people in that newly democratic nation exercised their liberty 
as they should; that is, having regard to others. Three nineteenth century American cases discussed 
by Picarda109 ground the charitable function of advancement of religion and the role religion plays in 
encouraging concern for others and self restraint. This is because these qualities are essential to 
civilisation and the welfare of society. In Holland v Peck the court held that religion was ‘the surest 
basis on which to rest the superstructure of social order.’110 In People ex rel Seminary of Our Lady of 
Angels v Barber religion was described as necessary to the advancement of civilisation and the 
promotion of the welfare of society’.111 In Gass and Bonta v Wilhite it was held that religion is a 
'valuable constituent in the character of our citizens’.112
                                                          
106 Rob Atkinson, 'Altruism in Nonprofit Organisations' (1990) 31 Boston College Law Review 501, 
565–566. 
 In such a context, advancement of religion is 
recognised as a charitable purpose enjoying the favour it does because of its role in underpinning 
107 Pemsel’s case [1891] AC 531, 557-559 (Lord Watson). 
108 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (George Lawrence trans, 1835, 1992 ed). 
109 H Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 1999) 84. 
110 Holland v Peck (1842) 37 NC 255, 258.   
111 People ex rel Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v Barber (1886) 3 NY St Rep 367 affirmed in (1887) 
13 NE 936.   
112 Gass and Bonta v Wilhite (1834) 32 Ky 170, 180.   
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the social order and creating social cohesion.113 That religion operates as a force obliging people to 
be good and thus underpins society is anchored in a widely accepted proposition that even though 
there is a great diversity of belief amongst religions, in the out-workings of behaviour, all of the 
major religions teach the equivalent of what is known in most common law countries as the golden 
rule. The golden rule which is often articulated as, ‘do to others as you would have them do to 
you’114 exhorts adherents to behave altruistically. Under this argument, religion provides a glue that 
binds society together voluntarily into community of citizens – the Greek polis or the Latin civitas. 
Such a voluntary binding together reduces the need for coercive compliance through enforced law. 
It also provides the substrate for voluntary concern for others as religious messages ‘conveyed from 
pulpits and in numerous publications’ are effective at ‘invigorating ... informal giving and support’ 
even if ‘not wholly consistent’.115 This role of religion arguably underpins Lord Cross’s 
pronouncement that the law ‘assumes that any religion is at least likely to be better than none’.116
If this recategorisation is accepted three alternative classes exist justifying favour on the grounds 
that they advance liberty,equality and fraternity. These are three concepts with deep historical and 
philosophical foundations. New Zealand courts and parliament could draw upon these foundations 
in the development of legislation or the common law. 
 
Understood in this light, religion is favoured because it binds the polis together, which facilitates 
freedom. In other words the favour is extended to advancement of religion because it advances 
liberty. 
While these three classes are collectively exhaustive they are not mutually exclusive categories. 
Different classes of favour might attach to one but not another. For example the advancement of 
liberty by facilitating freedom might only justify tax exemption but advancement of equality by 
dealing with disadvantage might justify both tax exemption and deductibility.  
Here then are two ideas for developing access to favours based on contribution to public benefit.  
Concluding Comments 
New Zealand is well positioned to reform the law of charities further.  In part, this may well be 
because it is managing its charity regulation better than many other common law countries. By 
separating the charity taxing function from the charity regulating function in 2005, New Zealand 
enabled itself to vary its regulatory space separate from its taxation agenda. By addressing private 
                                                          
113 Patrick M Garry, 'Religious Freedom Deserves more than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument 
for Non-Preferential Favouritism of Religion' (2005) 57(1) Florida Law Review 1, 12.   
114 The Holy Bible New International Version (1984) Luke 6:31. 
115 Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, The Culture of Giving: Informal Support and Gift-Exchange in Early 
Modern England` (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 14 and chapter 7. 
116 Neville Estates Ltd v Madden [1962] 1 Ch 832, 853.   
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benefit directly and leaving alone the common law presumption of public benefit it may have 
avoided considerable angst. Common law development is a potential challenge, but if this is a 
pressing practical concern there are relatively simple strategies to have more cases come to higher 
courts, such as cost agreements regardless of outcome and test case funding. The option of adding 
further heads to the definition of charitable purpose could be taken up.  It may not solve all 
challenges, but it will address some. It is an option adopted in many jurisdictions and case law on 
this approach is expected to emerge out of the UK over the next year or two.   
If New Zealand wishes to press beyond these two options there are two further possibilities.  One is 
to define the essence of charitable purposes as altruistic voluntary public benefiting purposes. This 
can be done by statute or case law development.  Statute is the simpler, but the case law approach 
could be tried. A more expansive development is to extend regulation to the whole of the nonprofit 
sector, perhaps carving out purposes that are to be excluded from regulation. Within and between 
these options there will also be a variety of hybrid options, which New Zealand is well positioned to 
explore. The Charities Commission, appears to have the confidence of the sector and is not 
embroiled in political controversy. It can provide a platform for both debate and common law case 
development. The variety of responses internationally, and commentary on those responses, 
provide insights into what could, and sometimes what should not, be done.  In simply being able to 
consider so many diverse options New Zealand is arguably the envy of other common law 
jurisdictions.  
This options paper has been designed to encourage reflection on possibilities. Each of the options 
presented has advantages and disadvantages which should be examined further. We have also set 
out two possible alternative approaches to the question of how to control access to favours. We 
would be pleased to explore each and any of the options in greater depth either in writing or in 
person.    
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Schedule 1 Models of Extension of Charitable Purpose Legislation 
1.1 Australia 
Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004 (Cth) 
4  Provision of child care services is a charitable purpose 
(1) Without limiting what constitutes a charitable purpose, charitable purpose includes the 
provision of child care services on a non-profit basis. 
(2) This section applies: 
(a) for the purposes of a provision of an Act or instrument; and 
(b) for the purpose of determining whether an institution or fund is, for the purposes of a 
provision of an Act or instrument, a charity. 
(3) The fact that, because of this section, a purpose of an institution or fund is a charitable 
purpose does not affect the question whether that purpose is for the public benefit. 
4A  Provision of a rental dwelling under National Rental Affordability Scheme is a charitable 
purpose 
(1) Without limiting what constitutes a charitable purpose, charitable purpose includes the 
provision of a rental dwelling if: 
(a) the rental dwelling is provided by an entity that is: 
(i) endorsed as exempt from income tax by the Commissioner of Taxation under 
section 50-105 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997; and 
(ii) an approved participant in the National Rental Affordability Scheme; and 
(b) either: 
(i) an allocation in relation to the rental dwelling has been made to the approved 
participant by the Secretary that specifies a date in the first 2 NRAS years from 
which the allocation will operate or is taken to have operated; or 
(ii) an allocation in relation to the rental dwelling has been reserved and it is 
genuinely intended by the approved participant that the conditions on which the 
allocation has been reserved will be fulfilled in the first 2 NRAS years. 
(2) To avoid doubt, the provision of the rental dwelling by the entity has effect as a charitable 
purpose only during the incentive period for the allocation. 
(3) This section applies: 
 (a) for the purposes of a provision of a taxation law or any instrument made, granted or 
issued under a taxation law; and 
 35 
 
 (b) for the purpose of determining whether an entity that has been endorsed as exempt 
from income tax by the Commissioner of Taxation under section 50-105 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997, remains, for the purposes of a provision of a taxation law or any 
instrument made, granted or issued under a taxation law, entitled to be so endorsed. 
5  Self-help groups and closed or contemplative religious orders are for the public benefit 
(1) Without limiting what constitutes a public benefit, an institution has a purpose that is for the 
public benefit to the extent that the institution is: 
(a) an open and non-discriminatory self-help group (see subsection (2)); or 
(b) a closed or contemplative religious order that regularly undertakes prayerful intervention 
at the request of members of the public. 
(2) An institution is an open and non-discriminatory self-help group if: 
(a) it is an association of individuals that has an open and non-discriminatory membership; 
and 
(b) it is established for the purpose of assisting individuals affected by: 
(i) a particular disadvantage or discrimination; or 
(ii) a need, arising out of a particular disadvantage or discrimination, that is not being 
met; and 
(c) it is made up of, and controlled by, individuals who are affected by the disadvantage or 
discrimination; and 
(d) all of its criteria for membership relate to its purpose; and 
(e) its membership is open to any individual who satisfies the criteria. 
(3) This section applies for the purpose of determining whether an institution is a charity, for the 
purposes of a provision of an Act or instrument. 
(4) The fact that, because of this section, a purpose of an institution is for the public benefit does 
not affect the question whether that purpose is a charitable purpose. 
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1.2 England and Wales  
Charities Act 2006 c 50 
Part 1 Meaning of "charity" and "charitable purpose"  
1 Meaning of "charity"  
(1) For the purposes of the law of England and Wales, "charity" means an institution which—  
(a) is established for charitable purposes only, and  
(b) falls to be subject to the control of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with 
respect to charities.  
(2) The definition of "charity" in subsection (1) does not apply for the purposes of an enactment if a 
different definition of that term applies for those purposes by virtue of that or any other enactment.  
(3) A reference in any enactment or document to a charity within the meaning of the Charitable Uses 
Act 1601 (c. 4) or the preamble to it is to be construed as a reference to a charity as defined by 
subsection (1).  
2 Meaning of "charitable purpose"  
(1) For the purposes of the law of England and Wales, a charitable purpose is a purpose which—  
(a) falls within subsection (2), and  
(b) is for the public benefit (see section 3).  
(2) A purpose falls within this subsection if it falls within any of the following descriptions of 
purposes—  
(a) the prevention or relief of poverty;  
(b) the advancement of education;  
(c) the advancement of religion;  
(d) the advancement of health or the saving of lives;  
(e) the advancement of citizenship or community development;  
(f) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science;  
(g) the advancement of amateur sport;  
(h) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion 
of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity;  
(i) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement;  
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(j) the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship 
or other disadvantage;  
(k) the advancement of animal welfare;  
(l) the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown, or of the efficiency of 
the police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services;  
(m) any other purposes within subsection (4).  
(3) In subsection (2)–  
(a) in paragraph (c) "religion" includes—  
(i) a religion which involves belief in more than one god, and  
(ii) a religion which does not involve belief in a god;  
(b) in paragraph (d) "the advancement of health" includes the prevention or relief of 
sickness, disease or human suffering;  
(c) paragraph (e) includes—  
(i) rural or urban regeneration, and  
(ii) the promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector or the 
effectiveness or efficiency of charities;  
(d) in paragraph (g) "sport" means sports or games which promote health by involving 
physical or mental skill or exertion;  
(e) paragraph (j) includes relief given by the provision of accommodation or care to the 
persons mentioned in that paragraph; and  
(f) in paragraph (l) "fire and rescue services" means services provided by fire and rescue 
authorities under Part 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (c. 21).  
(4) The purposes within this subsection (see subsection (2)(m)) are—  
(a) any purposes not within paragraphs (a) to (l) of subsection (2) but recognised as 
charitable purposes under existing charity law or by virtue of section 1 of the Recreational 
Charities Act 1958 (c. 17);  
(b) any purposes that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, 
any purposes falling within any of those paragraphs or paragraph (a) above; and,  
(c) any purposes that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, 
any purposes which have been recognised under charity law as falling within paragraph (b) 
above or this paragraph.  
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(5) Where any of the terms used in any of paragraphs (a) to (l) of subsection (2), or in subsection (3), 
has a particular meaning under charity law, the term is to be taken as having the same meaning 
where it appears in that provision.  
(6) Any reference in any enactment or document (in whatever terms)—  
(a) to charitable purposes, or  
(b) to institutions having purposes that are charitable under charity law,  
is to be construed in accordance with subsection (1). 
(7) Subsection (6)—  
(a) applies whether the enactment or document was passed or made before or after the 
passing of this Act, but  
(b) does not apply where the context otherwise requires.  
(8) In this section—  
• "charity law" means the law relating to charities in England and Wales; and 
• "existing charity law" means charity law as in force immediately before the day on which this 
section comes into force. 
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1.3 Northern Ireland  
Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 c 12 
PART 1 INTRODUCTORY  
Meaning of "charity" 
1.–(1) For the purposes of the law of Northern Ireland, "charity" means an institution which— 
(a) is established for charitable purposes only, and  
(b) falls to be subject to the control of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with 
respect to charities.  
(2) The definition of "charity" in subsection (1) does not apply for the purposes of a statutory 
provision if a different definition of that term applies for those purposes by virtue of that or any 
other statutory provision. 
(3) A charity shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to have a permanent endowment unless all 
property held for the purposes of the charity may be expended for those purposes without 
distinction between capital and income, and in this Act "permanent endowment" means, in relation 
to any charity, property held subject to a restriction on its being expended for the purposes of the 
charity. 
(4) The Commission may direct that for all or any of the purposes of this Act an institution 
established for any special purposes of or in connection with a charity (being charitable purposes) 
shall be treated as forming part of that charity or as forming a distinct charity. 
(5) The Commission may direct that for all or any of the purposes of this Act two or more charities 
having the same charity trustees shall be treated as a single charity. 
Meaning of "charitable purpose" 
2.–(1) For the purposes of the law of Northern Ireland, a charitable purpose is a purpose which— 
(a) falls within subsection (2), and  
(b) is for the public benefit (see section 3).  
(2) A purpose falls within this subsection if it falls within any of the following descriptions of 
purposes— 
(a) the prevention or relief of poverty;  
(b) the advancement of education;  
(c) the advancement of religion;  
(d) the advancement of health or the saving of lives;  
(e) the advancement of citizenship or community development;  
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(f) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science;  
(g) the advancement of amateur sport;  
(h) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion 
of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity;  
(i) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement;  
(j) the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship 
or other disadvantage;  
(k) the advancement of animal welfare;  
(l) any other purposes within subsection (4).  
(3) In subsection (2)— 
(a) in paragraph (c) "religion" includes—  
(i) a religion which involves belief in one god or more than one god, and  
(ii) any analogous philosophical belief (whether or not involving belief in a god);  
(b) in paragraph (d) "the advancement of health" includes the prevention or relief of 
sickness, disease or human suffering;  
(c) paragraph (e) includes—  
(i) rural or urban regeneration, and  
(ii) the promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector or the 
effectiveness or efficiency of charities;  
(d) in paragraph (g) "sport" means sports or games which promote health by involving 
physical or mental skill or exertion;  
(e) paragraph (h) includes the advancement of peace and good community relations; and  
(f) paragraph (j) includes relief given by the provision of accommodation or care to the 
persons mentioned in that paragraph  
(4) The purposes within this subsection (see subsection (2)(l)) are— 
(a) any purposes not within paragraphs (a) to (k) of subsection (2) but recognised as 
charitable purposes under existing charity law or by virtue of section 1 of the Recreational 
Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 1958 (c. 16);  
(b) any purposes that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to, or within the spirit of, 
any purposes falling within any of those paragraphs or paragraph (a) above; and  
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(c) any purposes that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to, or within the 
spirit of, any purposes which have been recognised under charity law as falling within 
paragraph (b) above or this paragraph.  
(5) Where any of the terms used in any of paragraphs (a) to (k) of subsection (2), or in 
subsection (3), has a particular meaning under charity law, the term is to be taken as having 
the same meaning where it appears in that provision. 
(6) Any reference in any statutory provision or document (in whatever terms)– 
(a) to charitable purposes, or  
(b) to institutions having purposes that are charitable under charity law,  
is to be construed in accordance with subsection (1). 
(7) Subsection (6)— 
(a) applies whether the statutory provision or document was passed or made before 
or after the passing of this Act, but  
(b) does not apply where the context otherwise requires.  
(8) In this section– 
"charity law" means the law relating to charities in Northern Ireland; and 
"existing charity law" means charity law as in operation immediately before the day on which 
this section comes into operation. 
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1.4 Scotland  
Charities and Trustees Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 section 7 
7   The charity test 
(1) A body meets the charity test if—  
(a) its purposes consist only of one or more of the charitable purposes, and  
(b) it provides (or, in the case of an applicant, provides or intends to provide) public benefit 
in Scotland or elsewhere.  
(2) The charitable purposes are—  
(a) the prevention or relief of poverty,  
(b) the advancement of education,  
(c) the advancement of religion,  
(d) the advancement of health,  
(e) the saving of lives,  
(f) the advancement of citizenship or community development,  
(g) the advancement of the arts, heritage, culture or science,  
(h) the advancement of public participation in sport,  
(i) the provision of recreational facilities, or the organisation of recreational activities, with 
the object of improving the conditions of life for the persons for whom the facilities or 
activities are primarily intended,  
(j) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation,  
(k) the promotion of religious or racial harmony,  
(l) the promotion of equality and diversity,  
(m) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement,  
(n) the relief of those in need by reason of age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or 
other disadvantage,  
(o) the advancement of animal welfare,  
(p) any other purpose that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to any of the preceding 
purposes.  
(3) In subsection (2)— 
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(a) in paragraph (d), "the advancement of health" includes the prevention or relief of 
sickness, disease or human suffering,  
(b) paragraph (f) includes—   
  (i) rural or urban regeneration, and  
  (ii) the promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector or the 
effectiveness or efficiency of charities,  
(c) in paragraph (h), "sport" means sport which involves physical skill and exertion,  
(d) paragraph (i) applies only in relation to recreational facilities or activities which are—   
  (i) primarily intended for persons who have need of them by reason of their age, ill-
health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage, or  
  (ii) available to members of the public at large or to male or female members of the 
public at large,  
(e) paragraph (n) includes relief given by the provision of accommodation or care, and  
(f) for the purposes of paragraph (p), the advancement of any philosophical belief (whether 
or not involving belief in a god) is analogous to the purpose set out in paragraph (c).  
(4) A body which falls within paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) does not, despite that 
subsection, meet the charity test if—  
(a) its constitution allows it to distribute or otherwise apply any of its property (on being 
wound up or at any other time) for a purpose which is not a charitable purpose,  
(b) its constitution expressly permits the Scottish Ministers or a Minister of the Crown to 
direct or otherwise control its activities, or  
(c) it is, or one of its purposes is to advance, a political party.  
(5) The Scottish Ministers may by order disapply either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
subsection (4) in relation to any body or type of body specified in the order. 
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1.5 Ireland  
Charities Act 2009 section 3 
3.—  
(1) For the purposes of this Act each of the following shall, subject to subsection (2), be a charitable 
purpose: 
(a) the prevention or relief of poverty or economic hardship; 
(b) the advancement of education; 
(c) the advancement of religion; 
(d) any other purpose that is of benefit to the community. 
(2) A purpose shall not be a charitable purpose unless it is of public benefit.  
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a gift shall not be of public benefit unless—  
(a) it is intended to benefit the public or a section of the public, and 
(b) in a case where it confers a benefit on a person other than in his or her capacity as a 
member of the public or a section of the public, any such benefit is reasonable in all of the 
circumstances, and is ancillary to, and necessary, for the furtherance of the public benefit.  
(4) It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a gift for the advancement of religion is 
of public benefit. 
(5) The Authority shall not make a determination that a gift for the advancement of religion is not of 
public benefit without the consent of the Attorney General. 
(6) A charitable gift for the purpose of the advancement of religion shall have effect, and the terms 
upon which it is given shall be construed, in accordance with the laws, canons, ordinances and 
tenets of the religion concerned.  
(7) In determining whether a gift is of public benefit or not, account shall be taken of— 
(a) any limitation imposed by the donor of the gift on the class of persons who may benefit 
from the gift and whether or not such limitation is justified and reasonable, having regard to 
the nature of the purpose of the gift, and 
(b) the amount of any charge payable for any service provided in furtherance of the purpose 
for which the gift is given and whether it is likely to limit the number of persons or classes of 
person who will benefit from the gift.  
(8) A limitation referred to in subsection (7) shall not be justified and reasonable if all of the 
intended beneficiaries of the gift or a significant number of them have a personal connection with 
the donor of the gift. 
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(9) There shall be no appeal to the Tribunal from a determination of the Authority to which 
subsection (5) applies. 
(10) For the purposes of this section, a gift is not a gift for the advancement of religion if it is made to 
or for the benefit of an organisation or cult- 
(a) the principal object of which is the making of profit, or 
(b) that employs oppressive psychological manipulation— 
(i) of its followers, or 
(ii) for the purpose of gaining new followers. 
(11) In this section "purpose that is of benefit to the community" includes— 
(a) the advancement of community welfare including the relief of those in need by reason of 
youth, age, ill-health, or disability, 
(b) the advancement of community development, including rural or urban regeneration, 
(c) the promotion of civic responsibility or voluntary work, 
(d) the promotion of health, including the prevention or relief of sickness, disease or human 
suffering, 
(e) the advancement of conflict resolution or reconciliation, 
(f) the promotion of religious or racial harmony and harmonious community relations, 
(g) the protection of the natural environment, 
(h) the advancement of environmental sustainability, 
(i) the advancement of the efficient and effective use of the property of charitable 
organisations, 
(j) the prevention or relief of suffering of animals,  
(k) the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or sciences, and 
(l) the integration of those who are disadvantaged, and the promotion of their full 
participation, in society. 
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1.6 Barbados  
Charities Act 1979 Volume VIII, Title XVIII, Chapter 243 
2. For the purposes of this Act 
… 
‘charity’ means any institution, corporate or not, which is established for charitable objects or 
purposes, is intended to and does operate for the public benefit, and is subject to the control 
of the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to charities; 
‘charitable objects’ has the same meaning as ‘charitable purposes’ as defined by section 3, 
and vice versa; 
… 
3. For the purposes of this Act, the expression ‘charitable purposes’ includes the following 
purposes, namely: 
(a) the relief and prevention of poverty, howsoever caused; 
(b) the relief and prevention of sickness and disability, both physical and mental, including: 
(i) the provision and staffing of hospitals, nursing and convalescent homes and 
clinics; 
(ii) the promotion of medical research; 
(iii) the provision of advice, treatment or comfort; and 
(iv) the establishment of homes, workshops or other centres for the disabled or the 
mentally or physically handicapped or any other disadvantaged or needy persons; 
(c) the relief of the suffering and distress or disability caused by old age, including the 
provision of homes for the care and maintenance of the old, and of housing for old 
people adapted to their special needs; 
(d)   the relief of distress caused by natural disasters or sudden catastrophes; 
(e)  the advancement of education, including: 
(i) the improvement of knowledge and its public dissemination in a way not 
constituting propaganda; 
(ii) the provision of schools, colleges, universities and other like institutions; 
(iii) the establishment in such institutions of professorships, fellowships, lectureships 
and other teaching and research posts; 
(iv) the provision in such institutions of scholarships, bursaries, prizes and other 
awards, 
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(v) the provision both within and without such institutions of physical training and 
sport for young persons; and 
(vi) the education of the public generally, including those not engaged in full-time 
study at such institution; 
(f) the promotion and publication of research with a view to increasing the common stock 
of knowledge; 
(g) the advancement of science and all recognised branches of learning and the 
establishment and maintenance of institutions therefor, including the support and 
maintenance of learned societies; 
(h) the cultivation of public taste in aesthetic matters, including art, music, literature and 
fine craftsmanship, and the establishment and development of facilities for their 
practice; 
(i) the provision and maintenance of museums and art galleries; 
(j) the advancement of religion and the encouragement of belief in, and reverence for, a 
divine power, and of the practice of worship of that power, including: 
(i) the organisation and carrying out of religious instruction and pastoral and 
missionary work in Barbados and overseas; 
(ii) the provision and maintenance of buildings for worship and other religious uses; 
(iii) the payment of stipends to and the provision of houses for ministers of religion, 
their widows and dependent children; and 
(iv) other purposes tending to promote the moral or spiritual welfare of the 
community; 
(k) the advancement of ethical and moral teachings and studies; 
(l) the provision of social welfare services for those in need of them; 
(m) the provision of housing for those in special need; 
(n) the promotion and improvement of the national heritage, whether physical, 
environmental, artistic, cultural or otherwise; 
(o) without prejudice to the operation of paragraph (e) (v), the promotion of sport and 
recreation, including the provision of facilities for recreation or other leisure-time 
occupations with the object of improving the conditions of life for those who have need 
of such facilities; 
(p) the welfare of children, including prevention of cruelty to them; 
(q) the promotion of the social welfare of the family, including the provision of facilities for 
family planning; 
 48 
 
(r) the welfare of animals, including prevention of cruelty to them; 
(s) the rehabilitation and resettlement of persons who have need of such services; 
(t) the establishment in life of young people; 
(u) the promotion and encouragement of projects for community development; 
(v) the establishment of organisations to assist members of the community with special 
needs such as one-parent families, single persons with dependants, battered spouses, 
specially gifted children and minority groups; 
(w) the provision of public work for the benefit of the community and the protection of the 
lives and property of the community; 
(x) the advancement and improvement of the standards of efficiency of industry, 
commerce and agriculture; 
(y) the maintenance and improvement of the efficiency of the armed forces and the Police 
Force and their welfare; and 
(z) any purpose within the spirit of, and analogous to, the foregoing. 
4. ‘Public benefit’ includes benefit of a kind comprised within the scope of charitable purposes 
which is available to members of the public at large or to a section of the public ascertained by 
reference to some specified geographical area, but does not include such a benefit if the persons for 
whom it is intended to be available are to be ascertained by reference to their relationship with 
some body or other person, whether that relationship is one of blood, status, contract or otherwise. 
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Schedule 2 United States Internal Revenue Code Exemptions 
26 USC §501(c)(3) 
(a) Exemption from taxation  
An organization described in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401 (a) shall be exempt from taxation 
under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503. 
… 
(c) List of exempt organizations  
The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a): … 
… 
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to 
foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does 
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
26 USC §501(c)(4) 
(a) Exemption from taxation  
An organization described in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401 (a) shall be exempt from taxation 
under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503. 
… 
(c) List of exempt organizations  
The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a):  
… 
(4)  
(A) Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion 
of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the 
employees of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of 
which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.  
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an entity unless no part of the net earnings of such entity 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.  
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Schedule 3 Singapore Institutions of a Public Character  
Income Tax (Approved Institutions of a Public Character) Regulations 2004 
PART II APPROVAL OF INSTITUTIONS OF A PUBLIC CHARACTER 
Conditions for approval of institution of a public character 
3.—(1) An institution or fund may be approved as an institution of a public character if it satisfies the 
following conditions: 
(a) it is— 
(i) a charity registered under section 5 of the Act; 
(ii) an exempt charity or other charity that is not required to be registered by virtue 
of section 5(4) of the Act; 
or 
(iii) an institution or fund that is described within paragraphs (a) to (i) of the 
definition of ‘‘institution of a public character’’ under section 40A of the Act; 
(b) its governing instruments are approved by the Sector Administrator; 
(c) its activities are exclusively beneficial to the community in Singapore as a whole and are 
not confined to sectional interests or groups of persons based on race, belief or religion; 
(d) its activities meet its objectives under its governing instruments and the objectives of the 
Sector Administrator; 
(e) it is administered by trustees— 
(i) at least half of whom are independent; and 
(ii) at least half of whom are citizens of Singapore; 
(f) its trustees are accountable for the management of donations received; 
(g) its auditor is approved by the Sector Administrator; and 
 (h) it meets such other conditions that the Sector Administrator may impose. 
(2) The conditions set out in paragraph (1)(c) or (1)(e)(ii) may be waived in respect of an applicant if 
such waiver is approved by the Minister. 
(3) The condition set out in paragraph (1)(e)(i) may be waived in respect of an applicant if such 
waiver is approved by the Commissioner. 
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(e)(i), a trustee shall be deemed to be not independent if— 
(a) the trustee is related to any individual or institution that established the applicant; 
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(b) the trustee is related to any individual who is involved in the general control and 
management of the administration of any institution that established the applicant; or 
(c) the trustee is one of a number of trustees of the applicant who are related to each other 
and who collectively constitute at least half of the total number of trustees of the applicant. 
(5) For the purposes of paragraph (4), a trustee is related to an individual or another trustee if the 
trustee is a family member of that individual or other trustee and, for this purpose, a ‘‘family 
member’’ means a child, sibling, parent, spouse, spouse’s parent, spouse’s sibling, grandparent or 
grandchild. 
(6) For the purposes of paragraph (4), a trustee is related to an institution if the trustee is— 
(a) a director (other than an independent director) or senior executive of— 
(i) the institution; or 
(ii) a holding company or subsidiary of the institution, 
where the institution is a company or corporation within the meaning of the Companies Act  
(b) an officer of the institution, where the institution is a society registered under the 
Societies Act (Cap. 311); 
(c) a trustee of the institution, where the institution is a trust; or (d) involved in the general 
control and management of the administration of the institution, in any other case. 
 (7) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(e)(ii), where the trustee is a company, it shall be treated as a 
citizen of Singapore if at least half of the number of directors of the company are citizens of 
Singapore. 
